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ABSTRACT
It has recently been shown that ReLU networks produce arbitrarily over-confident
predictions far away from the training data. Thus, ReLU networks do not know
when they don’t know. However, this is a highly important property in safety
critical applications. In the context of out-of-distribution detection (OOD) there
have been a number of proposals to mitigate this problembut none of them are able
to make any mathematical guarantees. In this paper we propose a new approach
to OOD which overcomes both problems. Our approach can be used with ReLU
networks and provides provably low confidence predictions far away from the
training data as well as the first certificates for low confidence predictions in a
neighborhood of an out-distribution point. In the experiments we show that state-
of-the-art methods fail in this worst-case setting whereas our model can guarantee
its performance while retaining state-of-the-art OOD performance.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning Models are being deployed in a growing number of applications. As these include
more and more systems where safety is a concern, it is important to guarantee that deep learning
models work as one expects them to. One topic that has received a lot of attention in this area is
the problem of adversarial examples, in which a model’s prediction can be changed by introducing
a small perturbation to an originally correctly classified sample. Achieving robustness against this
type of perturbation is an active field of research. Empirically, adversarial training (Madry et al.,
2018) performs well and provably robust models have been developed (Hein & Andriushchenko,
2017; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019).
On the other end of the spectrum it is also important to study how deep learning models behave far
away from the training samples. A simple property every classifier should satisfy is that far away
from the training data, it should yield close to uniform confidence over the classes: it knows when
it does not know. However, several cases of high confidence predictions far away from the training
data have been reported for neural networks, e.g. fooling images (Nguyen et al., 2015), for out-
of-distribution (OOD) images (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017) or in medical diagnosis (Leibig et al.,
2017). Moreover, it has been observed that, even on the original task, neural networks often produce
overconfident predictions (Guo et al., 2017). Very recently, it has been shown theoretically that the
class of ReLU networks (all neural networks which use a piecewise affine activation function), which
encompasses almost all standard models, produces predictions with arbitrarily high confidences far
away from the training data (Hein et al., 2019). Unfortunately, this statements holds for almost all
such networks and thus without a change in the architecture one cannot avoid this phenomenon.
Traditionally, the calibration of the confidence of predictions has been considered on the in-
distribution (Guo et al., 2017; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2017). However these techniques can-
not be used for OOD techniques (Leibig et al., 2017). Only recently the detection of OOD in-
puts (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017) has been tackled. The existing approaches are roughly of two
types: first, postprocessing techniques that adjust the estimated confidence (DeVries & Taylor, 2018;
Liang et al., 2018) which includes the baseline ODIN. Second, modification of the classifier train-
ing by integrating generative models like a VAE or GAN in order to discriminate out-distribution
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Figure 1: Illustration on toy dataset: We show the color-coded confidence in the prediction (yellow
indicates high confidence maxy pˆ(y|x) ≈ 1, whereas dark purple regions indicate low confidence
maxy pˆ(y|x) ≈ 0.5) for a normal neural network (left) and our CCU neural network (right). The
decision boundary is shown in white which is similar for both models. Our CCU-model retains
high-confidence predictions in regions close to the training data, whereas far away from the training
the CCU-model outputs close to uniform confidence. In contrast the normal neural network is over-
confident everywhere except very close to the decision boundary.
from in-distribution data (Lee et al., 2018a; Wang et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018b) or approaches
which enforce low confidence on OOD inputs during training (Hein et al., 2019; Hendrycks et al.,
2019). Worst-case aspects of OOD detection have previously been studied in Nguyen et al. (2015);
Schott et al. (2018); Hein et al. (2019); Sehwag et al. (2019), but no robustness guarantees have yet
been proposed for this setting. In particular, none of those approaches are able to guarantee that
neural networks produce low confidence predictions far away from the training data. We prove that
our classifier satisfies this requirement even when we use ReLU networks as the classifier model
- without loosing performance on either the prediction task on the in-distribution nor the OOD de-
tection performance, see Figure 1 for an illustration. Moreover, our technique allows to give upper
bounds on the confidence over a whole neighborhood around a point (worst-case guarantees). We
show that most state-of-the-art OOD methods can be fooled by maximizing the confidence in this
ball even when starting from uniform noise images, which should be trivial to identify.
2 A GENERIC MODEL FOR CLASSIFIERS WITH CERTIFIED LOW CONFIDENCE
FAR AWAY FROM THE TRAINING DATA
The model which we propose in this paper assumes that samples from an out-distribution are given
to us. In image recognition we could either see the set of all images as a sample from the out-
distribution (Hendrycks et al., 2019) on all images or the agnostic case where we use use uniform
noise on [0, 1]d as a maximally uninformative out-distribution. In both settings one tries to discrimi-
nate these out-distribution images from images coming from a particular image recognition task and
the task is to get low confidence predictions on the out-distribution images vs. higher confidence
on the images from the actual task. From the general model we derive under minimal assumptions
a maximum-likelihood approach where one trains both a classifier for the actual task and density
estimators for in- and out-distribution jointly. As all of these quantities are coupled in our model for
the conditional distribution P(y|x) we get guarantees by controlling the density estimates far away
from the training data. This is a crucial difference to the approaches of Lee et al. (2018a); Wang et al.
(2018); Hendrycks et al. (2019) which empirically yield good OOD performance but are not able to
certify the detection mechanism.
2.1 A PROBABILISTIC MODEL FOR IN- AND OUT-DISTRIBUTION DATA
We assume that there exists a joint probability distribution p(y, x) over the in- and out-distribution
data, where y are the labels in {1, . . . ,M},M is the number of classes, and x ∈ Rd, where d is the
input dimension. In the following, we denote the underlying probabilities/densities with p(y|x) resp.
p(x) and the estimated quantities with pˆ(y|x) and pˆ(x). We are mainly interested in a discriminative
framework, i.e. we want to estimate p(y|x) which one can represent via the conditional distribution
of the in-distribution p(y|x, i) and out-distribution p(y|x, o):
p(y|x) = p(y|x, i)p(i|x) + p(y|x, o)p(o|x) = p(y|x, i)p(x|i)p(i) + p(y|x, o)p(x|o)p(o)
p(x|i)p(i) + p(x|o)p(o) . (1)
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Note that at first it might seem strange to have a conditional distribution p(y|x, o) for out-distribution
data, but until now we have made no assumptions about what in-and out-distribution are. A realis-
tic scenario would be that at test time we are presented with instances x from other classes (out-
distribution) for which we expect a close to uniform p(y|x, o).
Our model for pˆ(y|x) has the same form as p(y|x)
pˆ(y|x) = pˆ(y|x, i)pˆ(x|i)pˆ(i) + pˆ(y|x, o)pˆ(x|o)pˆ(o)
pˆ(x|i)pˆ(i) + pˆ(x|o)pˆ(o) . (2)
Typically, out-distribution data has no relation to the actual task and thus we would like to have
uniform confidence over the classes. Therefore we set in our model
pˆ(y|x, o) = 1
M
and pˆ(y|x, i) = e
fy(x)∑M
k=1 e
fk(x)
, y ∈ {1, . . .M}, (3)
where f : Rd → RM is the classifier function (logits). This framework is generic for classifiers
trained with the cross-entropy (CE) loss (as the softmax function is the correct link function for
the CE loss) and we focus in particular on neural networks. For a ReLU network the classifier
function f is componentwise a continuous piecewise affine function and has been shown to produce
asymptotically arbitrarily highly confident predictions (Hein et al., 2019), i.e. the classifier gets
more confident in its predictions the further it moves away from its training data. One of the main
goals of our proposal is to fix this behavior of neural networks in a provable way.
Note that with the choice of pˆ(y|x, o) and non-zero priors for pˆ(i), pˆ(o) , the full model pˆ(y|x) can be
seen as a calibrated version of pˆ(y|x, i), where pˆ(y|x) ≈ pˆ(y|x, i) for inputs with pˆ(x|i) ≫ pˆ(x|o)
and pˆ(y|x) ≈ 1
M
if pˆ(x|i) ≪ pˆ(x|o). However, note that only the confidence in the prediction
pˆ(y|x) is affected, the classifier decision is still done according to pˆ(y|x, i) as the calibration does
not change the ranking. Thus even if the OOD data came from the classification task we would
like to solve, the trained classifier’s performance would be unaffected, only the confidence in the
prediction would be damped.
For the marginal out-distribution pˆ(x|o) there are two possible scenarios. In the first case one could
concentrate on the worst case where we assume that p(x|o) is maximally uniformative (maximal
entropy). This means that pˆ(x|o) is uniform for bounded domains e.g. for images which are in
[0, 1]d, pˆ(x|o) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]d, or pˆ(x|o) is a Gaussian for the domain of Rd (the Gaus-
sian has maximum entropy among all distributions of fixed variance). However, in this work we
follow the approach of Hendrycks et al. (2019) where they used the 80 million tiny image dataset
(Torralba et al., 2008) as a proxy of all possible images. Thus we estimate the density of pˆ(x|o)
using this data.
In order to get guarantees, the employed generative models for pˆ(x|i) and pˆ(x|o) have to be chosen
in a way that allows one to control predictions far away from the training data. Variational au-
toencoders (VAEs) (Kingma & Welling, 2014; Rezende et al., 2014), normalizing flows (Dinh et al.,
2016; Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018) and generative adversarial networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) are powerful generative models. However, there is no direct way to control the likelihood far
away from the training data. Moreover, it has recently been discovered that VAEs, flows and GANs
also suffer from overconfident likelihoods (Nalisnick et al., 2019; Hendrycks et al., 2019) far away
from the data they are supposed to model as well as adversarial samples (Kos et al., 2017).
For pˆ(x|o) and pˆ(x|i) we use a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) which is less powerful than a VAE
but has the advantage that the density estimates can be controlled far away from the training data:
pˆ(x|i) =
Ki∑
k=0
αk exp
(
−d(x, µk)
2
2σ2k
)
, pˆ(x|o) =
Ko∑
l=0
βl exp
(
−d(x, νl)
2
2θ2l
)
(4)
where d : Rd × Rd → R is the metric
d(x, y) =
∥∥∥C− 12 (x − y)∥∥∥
2
.
with C being a positive definite matrix and
αk =
1
Ki
1
(2πσ2k detC)
d
2
, βl =
1
Ko
1
(2πθ2l detC)
d
2
.
3
We later fix C as a slightly modified covariance matrix of the in-distribution data (see Section 4 for
details). Thus one just has to estimate the centroids µk, νl and the variances σ
2
k, θ
2
l . The idea of
this metric is to use distances adapted to the data-distribution. Note that equation 4 is a properly
normalized density in Rd.
2.2 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
Given models for pˆ(y|x) and pˆ(x) we effectively have a full generative model and apply maximum
likelihood estimation to get the underlying classifier pˆ(y|x, i) and the parameters of the Gaussian
mixture models pˆ(x|i), pˆ(x|o). The only free parameter left is the probability pˆ(i), pˆ(o) which we
write compactly as λ = pˆ(o)
pˆ(i) . In principle this parameter should be set considering the potential cost
of over-confident predictions. In our experiments we simply fix it to λ = 1.
E
(x,y)∼p(x,y)
log
(
pˆ(y, x)
)
= E
(x,y)∼p(x,y)
log
(
pˆ(y|x))+ log(pˆ(x)),
= E
(x,y)∼p(x,y)
log
(
pˆ(y|x, i)pˆ(x|i)pˆ(i) + 1
M
pˆ(x|o)pˆ(o)
pˆ(x|i)pˆ(i) + pˆ(x|o)pˆ(o)
)
+ log
(
pˆ(x|i)pˆ(i) + pˆ(x|o)pˆ(o)). (5)
In practice, we have to compute empirical expectations from finite training data from the in-
distribution (xi, yi)
ni
i=1 and out-distribution (zj)
no
j=1. Labels for the out-distribution could be gener-
ated randomly via p(y|x, o) = 1
M
, but we obtain an unbiased estimator with lower variance by aver-
aging over all classes directly, as was done in Lee et al. (2018a); Hein et al. (2019); Hendrycks et al.
(2019). Now we can estimate the classifier f and the mixture model parameters µ, ν, σ, θ via
argmax
f,µ,ν,σ,θ
{
1
ni
ni∑
i=1
log
(
pˆ(yi|xi)
)
+
λ
no
no∑
j=1
1
M
M∑
m=1
log
(
pˆ(m|zj)
)
(6)
+
1
ni
ni∑
i=1
log(pˆ(xi)) +
λ
no
no∑
j=1
log(pˆ(zj))

, (7)
with
pˆ(y|x) = pˆ(y|x, i)pˆ(x|i) +
λ
M
pˆ(x|o)
pˆ(x|i) + λpˆ(x|o) and pˆ(x) =
1
λ+ 1
(
pˆ(x|i) + λpˆ(x|o)
)
. (8)
Due to the bounds derived in Section 3, we denote our method by Certified Certain Un-
certainty (CCU). Note that if one uses a standard neural network model with softmax, i.e.
pˆ(y|x) = pˆ(y|x, i) = efy(x)∑M
m=1 e
fm(x)
, then the first term in equation 6 would be the cross-entropy loss
for the in-distribution data and the second term the cross entropy loss for the out-distribution data
with a uniform distribution over the classes. For this choice of pˆ(y|x) and neglecting the terms for
pˆ(x) we recover the approach of Hein et al. (2019); Hendrycks et al. (2019) for training a classifier
which outputs uniform confidence predictions on out-distribution data where
pˆ(i)
pˆ(o) corresponds to
that regularization parameter λ. The key difference in our approach is that pˆ(y|x) 6= pˆ(y|x, i) and
the estimated densities for in- and out distribution pˆ(x|i) and pˆ(x|o) lead to a confidence calibration
of pˆ(y|x), and in turn the fit of the classifier influences the estimation of pˆ(x|i) and pˆ(x|o). The ma-
jor advantage of our model is that we can give guarantees on the confidence of the classifier decision
far away from the training data.
3 PROVABLE GUARANTEES FOR CLOSE TO UNIFORM PREDICTIONS FAR
AWAY FROM THE TRAINING DATA
In this section we provide two types of guarantees on the confidence of a classifier trained according
to our model in equation 6. The first one says that the classifier has provably low confidence far
away from the training data, where an explicit bound on the minimal distance is provided, and the
second provides an upper bound on the confidence in a ball around a given input point. The lat-
ter bound resembles robustness guarantees for adversarial samples (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017;
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Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018) and is quite different from the
purely empirical evaluation done in OOD detection papers as we show in Section 4.
We provide our bounds for a more general mixture model which includes our GMM in equation 4
as a special case. Up to our knowledge, these are the first such bounds for neural networks and thus
it is the first modification of a ReLU neural network so that it provably “knows when it does not
know” (Hein et al., 2019) in the sense that far away from the training data the predictions are close
to uniform over the classes.
Theorem 3.1. Let (x
(i)
i , y
(i)
i )
n
i=1 be the training set of the in-distribution and let the model for the
conditional probability be given as
∀x ∈ Rd, y ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, pˆ(y|x) = pˆ(y|x, i)pˆ(x|i) +
λ
M
pˆ(x|o)
pˆ(x|i) + λpˆ(x|o) , (9)
where λ = pˆ(o)
pˆ(i) > 0 and let the model for the marginal density of the in-distribution pˆ(x|i) and
out-distribution p(x|o) be given by the generalized GMMs
pˆ(x|i) =
Ki∑
k=0
αk exp
(
−d(x, µk)
2
2σ2k
)
, pˆ(x|o) =
Ko∑
l=0
βl exp
(
−d(x, νl)
2
2θ2l
)
with αk, βl > 0 and µk, νl ∈ Rd ∀k = 1, . . .Ki, l = 1, . . . ,Ko and d : Rd ×
R
d → R+ a metric. Let z ∈ Rd and define k∗ = argmin
k=1,...,Ki
d(z,µk)
σk
, i∗ = argmin
i=1,...,n
d(z, xi),
l∗ = argmin
l=1,...,Ko
βl exp
(
− d(z,νl)2
2θ2l
)
and∆ =
θ2l∗
σ2
k∗
− 1. For any ǫ > 0, if minl θl > maxk σk and
mini=1,...,n d(z, xi) ≥ d(xi∗ , µk∗)+d(µk∗ , νl∗)
[ 2
∆
+
1√
∆
]
+
θl∗√
∆
√
log
( ǫ λ
M − 1
βl∗∑
k αk
)
, (10)
then it holds for allm ∈ {1, . . . ,M} that
pˆ(m|z) ≤ 1
M
(
1 + ǫ
)
. (11)
In particular, ifmini d(z, xi)→∞, then pˆ(m|z)→ 1M .
The proof is in the Appendix A. Theorem 3.1 holds for any multi-class classifier which defines for
each input a probability distribution over the labels. Given the parameters of the GMM’s it quantifies
at which distance of an input z to the training set the classifier achieves close to uniform confidence.
The theorem holds even if we use ReLU classifiers which in their unmodified form have been shown
to produce arbitrarily high confidence far away from the training data Hein et al. (2019). This is a
first step towards neural networks which provably know when they don’t know.
In the next corollary, we provide an upper bound on the confidence over a ball around a given data
point. This allows to give “confidence guarantees” for a whole volume and thus is much stronger
than the usual pointwise evaluation of OOD methods.
Corollary 3.1. Let x0 ∈ Rd and R > 0, then with λ = pˆ(o)pˆ(i) it holds
max
d(x,x0)≤R
pˆ(y|x) ≤ 1
M
1 +M b
λ
1 + b
λ
, (12)
where b =
∑Ki
k=1 αk exp
(
−
max{d(x0,µk)−R,0}
2
2σ2
k
)
∑Ko
l=1
βl exp
(
−
(d(x0,νl)+R)
2
2θ2
l
) .
The proof is in the Appendix B. We show in Section 4 that even though OOD methods achieve
low confidence on noise images, the maximization of the confidence in a ball around a noise point
(adversarial noise) yields high confidence predictions for OOD methods, whereas our classifier has
provably low confidence, as certified by Corollary 3.1. The failure of OOD methods shows that the
certification of entire regions is an important contribution of CCU which goes beyond the purely
sampling-based evaluation.
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MNIST
.
Seed
8: 1.00
Base
8: 0.00*
MCD
0: 1.00
GAN
8: 0.10
ODIN
3: 76.64*
Maha
5: 1.00
ACET
2: 1.00
OE
9: 0.10
CCU
FMNIST
. shirt: 1.00 dress: 0.00* shirt: 1.00 shirt: 0.13 bag: 267.29* shirt: 0.16 bag: 1.00 boot: 0.10
SVHN
. 1: 1.00 2: 0.00* 4: 0.10 4: 1.00 6: 103.56* 1: 0.13 7: 1.00 9: 0.10
CIFAR10
. bird: 1.00 cat: 0.00* bird: 1.00 bird: 1.00 bird: 122.99* horse: 0.53 frog: 1.00 truck: 0.10
Figure 2: Adversarial Noise: We maximize the confidence of the OOD methods using PGD in the
ball around a uniform noise sample (seed images, left) on which CCU is guaranteed by Corollary 3.1
to yield less than 1.1 1
M
maximal confidence. For each OOD method we report the image with the
highest confidence. Maha andMCD use scores where lower is more confident (indicated by ∗). If we
do not find a sample that has higher confidence/lower score than the mean of the in-distribution, we
highlight this in boldface. All other OODmethods fail on some dataset, see Table 1 for a quantitative
version. Arguably ACET produces good samples on MNIST, but the sample is classified as a 5.
ODIN at high temperatures always returns low confidence, so a value of 0.1 is not informative.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the worst-case performance of various OOD detection methods within regions for
which CCU yields guarantees and by standard OOD on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998), FashionM-
NIST (Xiao et al., 2017), SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009).
We show that all other OOD methods yield undesired high confidence predictions in the certified
low confidence regions of CCU and thus would not detect these inputs as out-distribution. For
calibrating hyperparameters resp. training we use for all OOD methods the 80 Million Tiny Im-
ages (Torralba et al., 2008) as out-distribution Hendrycks et al. (2019) which yields a fair and realis-
tic comparison.
CCU: As the Euclidean metric is known to be a relatively bad distance between two images we
instead use the distance d(x, y) =
∥∥∥C− 12 (x− y)∥∥∥, where C is generated as follows. We calculate
the covariance matrix C′ on augmented in-distribution samples (see C.1). Let (λi, ui)
d
i=1 be the
eigenvalues/eigenvectors of C′. Then we set
C =
d∑
i=1
max{λi, 10−6maxj λj}uiuTi , (13)
that is we fix a lower bound on the smallest eigenvalue so that C has full rank. This metric strongly
penalizes moving away from the in-distribution. We choose Ki = Ko = 100 as the number of
centroids for the GMMs. We initialize the in-GMM on augmented in-data using the EM algorithm
with spherical covariancematrices in the transformed space, as in equation 4. For the out-distribution
we use a subset of 20000 points for the initialization. While, initially it holds that ∀k, l : σk < θl,
as required in Theorem 3.1, this is not guaranteed during the optimization of equation 6. Thus, we
enforce the constraint during training by setting: θl 7→ max{θl, 2maxk σk} at every gradient step.
Since the “classifier” and “density” terms in equation 6 have very different magnitudes we choose a
small learning rate of 1e− 5 for the parameters in the GMMs. It is also crucial to not apply weight
decay to these parameters. The other hyperparameters are chosen as in the base model below.
Benchmarks: For all OODmethods we use LeNet onMNIST and a Resnet18 (for GAN andMCD
we use VGG) otherwise. The hyperparameters used during training can be found in AppendixC. The
AUC is computed by treating in-distribution versus out-distribution as a two-class problem using
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Base MCD GAN ODIN Maha ACET OE CCU
MNIST TE 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4
SR 100.0 100.0 62.5 100.0 99.5 90.5 100.0 0.0
AUC 4.1 5.3 41.2 0.0 22.9 28.3 35.2 100.0
FMNIST TE 4.9 5.6 6.3 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.7 4.9
SR 100.0 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
AUC 0.0 33.5 35.9 0.0 24.0 100.0 35.7 100.0
SVHN TE 3.0 3.9 4.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.1 3.0
SR 100.0 99.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
AUC 0.0 23.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 13.5 100.0
CIFAR10 TE 5.7 12.0 11.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 4.7 5.8
SR 100.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
AUC 0.0 17.2 25.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.4 100.0
Table 1: Worst-case performance of different OODmethods in neighborhoods around uniform noise
points certified by CCU. We report the clean test error (TE) on the in-distribution (GAN and MCD
use VGG). The success rate (SR) is the fraction of adversarial noise points for which the confi-
dence/score inside the ball is higher than the median of the in-distribution’s confidence/score. The
AUC quantifies detection of adversarial noise versus in-distribution. All values in %.
the confidence/score of the method as criterion. MCD: Monte-Carlo Dropout (Gal & Ghahramani,
2016) uses dropout at train and at test time. Since it is not clear where to put the dropout layers in
a ResNet, we use VGG instead. We take the softmax from 7 forward passes (Shafaei et al., 2018)
and use the mean of the output for prediction and the variance as score. GAN: The framework
of confidence-calibrated classifiers (Lee et al., 2017) relies on training a GAN alongside a classifier
such that the GAN’s generator is encouraged to generate points close to but not on the in-distribution.
On these points one then enforces uniform confidence. We used their provided code to train a VGG
this way, as we were unable to adapt the method to a ResNet with an acceptable test error (e.g.
TE< 30% on SVHN). ODIN: ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) consists of two parts: a temperature T by
which one rescales the logits before the softmax layer e
fn/T∑
k e
fk/T
and a preprocessing step that applies
a single FGSM-step (Goodfellow et al., 2015) of length ǫ before evaluating the input. The two
parameters are calibrated on the out-distribution. Maha: The approach in Lee et al. (2018c) is based
on computing a class-conditional Mahalanobis distance in feature space and applying an ODIN-like
preprocessing step for each layer. Following Ren et al. (2019) we use a single-layer version of this
on our networks’ penultimate layers because the multi-layer version in the original code does not
support gradient-based attacks. OE: Outlier exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2019) enforces uniform
confidence on a large out-distribution. We use their provided code to train a model with our chosen
architecture. ACET: Adversarial confidence enhanced training (ACET) (Hein et al., 2019) enforces
uniform confidence on a ball around points from an out-distribution by running adversarial attacks
during training. In order to make the comparison with OE more meaningful we use 80M tiny images
to draw the seeds rather than smoothed uniform noise as in Hein et al. (2019).
Some of the above OOD papers optimize their hyperparameters on a validation set for each out-
distribution they test on. However, this leads to different classifiers for each out-distribution dataset
which seems unrealistic as we want to have good generic OOD performance and not for a particular
dataset. Thus we keep the comparison realistic and fair by calibrating the hyperparameters of all
methods on a subset of 80M tiny images and then evaluating on the other unseen distributions.
Certified robustness against adversarial noise: We sample uniform noise images as they are
obviously out-distribution for all tasks and certify using Corollary 3.1 the largest ball around the
uniform noise sample on which CCU attains at most 1.1· uniform confidence, that is 11% on all
datasets. We describe how to compute the radius of this ball in AppendixD.We construct adversarial
noise samples for all OOD methods by maximizing the confidence/minimizing the score via a PGD
attack with 500 steps and 50 random restarts on this ball. Further details of the attack can be found
in Appendix C.2. In Table 1 we show the results of running this attack on the different models. We
used 200 noise images and we report clean test error on the in-distribution, the success rate (SR)
(fraction of adversarial noise points for which the confidence resp. score inside the ball is higher
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Base MCD GAN ODIN Maha ACET OE CCU
MNIST FMNIST 97.1 77.5 99.4 98.3 97.2 100.0 99.9 99.9
EMNIST 89.5 74.1 92.8 88.7 92.4 96.6 95.8 92.3
GrayCIFAR10 99.6 75.2 99.1 99.9 97.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Noise 100.0 77.1 99.3 100.0 97.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
UniformNoise 91.9 77.4 99.9 96.8 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0
FMNIST MNIST 97.0 74.9 99.7 99.2 97.1 96.9 96.3 97.6
EMNIST 97.7 79.9 99.9 99.4 97.8 97.4 99.3 99.5
GrayCIFAR10 87.7 87.6 91.1 90.4 97.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
Noise 95.9 89.7 99.4 98.4 98.8 99.8 100.0 100.0
UniformNoise 96.6 89.4 81.2 98.3 98.4 100.0 97.6 100.0
SVHN CIFAR10 95.3 87.6 96.8 95.9 96.5 94.7 100.0 100.0
CIFAR100 94.9 87.3 96.1 95.5 96.0 94.7 100.0 100.0
LSUN_CR 95.1 84.5 99.0 96.1 95.9 98.0 100.0 100.0
Imagenet- 94.7 87.7 97.7 95.5 96.1 98.0 100.0 100.0
Noise 96.5 88.6 96.3 87.0 97.4 95.7 97.8 97.3
UniformNoise 97.9 88.5 100.0 98.9 97.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
CIFAR10 SVHN 93.3 76.6 83.9 94.6 94.8 93.0 98.8 98.0
CIFAR100 86.9 74.9 82.9 86.9 68.7 86.7 95.3 94.1
LSUN_CR 91.7 76.2 89.9 92.8 68.4 91.9 98.6 98.0
Imagenet- 86.3 74.8 83.9 86.5 65.7 90.1 94.7 93.1
Noise 94.7 74.2 81.8 96.0 81.2 94.6 97.3 97.3
UniformNoise 90.0 77.4 73.0 92.1 56.7 100.0 98.8 100.0
Table 2: AUC (in- versus out-distribution based on confidence/score) in percent for different OOD
methods and datasets (higher is better). OE and CCU have the best OOD performance.
resp. lower than the median of the in-distribution’s confidence/score) and the AUC for the separation
of the generated adversarial noise images and the in-distribution based on confidence/score. By
construction, see Corollary 3.1, our method provably makes no overconfident predictions but we
nevertheless run the attack on CCU as well. We note that only CCU performs perfectly on this task
for all datasets. We also see that ACET achieves very robust performance which is maybe expected
as it does some kind of adversarial training for OOD detection. Nevertheless ACET can be broken on
MNIST and has no guarantees. We illustrate the generated adversarial noise images for all methods
in Figure 2.
OOD performance: For each dataset and method we report the AUC for the binary classification
problem of discriminating in- and out-distribution based on confidence resp. score. The results are
shown in Table 2. The list of datasets we use for OOD detection can be seen in Table 2. LSUN_CR
refers to only the classroom class of LSUN and Imagenet- is a subset of 10000 resized Imagenet
validation images, that have no overlap with CIFAR10/CIFAR100 classes. The noise dataset was
obtained as in Hein et al. (2019) by first shuffling the pixels of the test images in the in-distribution
and then smoothing them by a Gaussian filter of uniformly random width, followed by a rescaling
so that the images have full range. We see that OE and CCU have the best OOD performance. MCD
is worse than the base model which confirms the results found in Leibig et al. (2017) that MCD is
not useful for OOD. The performance of Maha is worse than what has been reported in Lee et al.
(2018c) which can have two reasons. We just use their version where one uses the scores only from
the last layer and we do not calibrate hyperparameters for each test set separately but just once on
the Tiny Image dataset. Especially on CIFAR10 we found that the results depend strongly on the
step size. The results of ACET, GAN and ODIN are mixed but clearly outperform the baseline.
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2 we see that most models perform well when evaluating on uniform
noise but fail when finding the worst case in a small neighborhood around the noise point. Thus we
think that such worst-case analysis should become standard in OOD evaluation.
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5 CONCLUSION
In Hein et al. (2019) it has recently been shown that ReLU networks produce arbitrarily highly
confident predictions far away from the training data, which could only be resolved by a modification
of the network architecture. With CCU we present such a modification which explicitly integrates
a generative model and provably show that the resulting neural network produces close to uniform
predictions far away from the training data. Moreover, CCU is the only OOD method which can
guarantee low confidence predictions over a whole volume rather than just pointwise and we show
that all other OOD methods fail in this worst-case setting. CCU achieves this without loss in test
accuracy or OOD performance. In the future it would be interesting to use more powerful generative
models for which one can also guarantee their behavior far away from the training data. This is
currently not the case for VAEs and GANs (Nalisnick et al., 2019; Hendrycks et al., 2019).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author acknowledge support from the BMBF through the Tübingen AI Center (FKZ:
01IS18039A) and by the DFG TRR 248, project number 389792660 and the DFG Excellence Clus-
ter “Machine Learning -New Perspectives for Science”, EXC 2064/1, project number 390727645.
The authors thank the International Max Planck Research School for Intelligent Systems (IMPRS-
IS) for supporting Alexander Meinke.
REFERENCES
H. H. Bauschke and J. M. Borwein. On projection algorithms for solving convex feasibility problems.
SIAM Review, 38:367–426, 1996.
JeremyMCohen, Elan Rosenfeld, and J Zico Kolter. Certified adversarial robustness via randomized
smoothing. arXiv:1902.02918, 2019.
T. DeVries and G. W. Taylor. Learning confidence for out-of-distribution detection in neural net-
works. preprint, arXiv:1802.04865v1, 2018.
Laurent Dinh, Jascha Sohl-Dickstein, and Samy Bengio. Density estimation using real nvp.
arXiv:1605.08803, 2016.
Y. Gal and Z. Ghahramani. Dropout as a bayesian approximation: Representing model uncertainty
in deep learning. In ICML, 2016.
I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In
ICLR, 2015.
I.J. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu, D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair, A. Courville, and
Y. Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In NeurIPS, 2014.
C. Guo, G. Pleiss, Y. Sun, and K. Weinberger. On calibration of modern neural networks. In ICML,
2017.
M. Hein and M. Andriushchenko. Formal guarantees on the robustness of a classifier against adver-
sarial manipulation. In NeurIPS, 2017.
M. Hein, M. Andriushchenko, and J. Bitterwolf. Why ReLU networks yield high-confidence predic-
tions far away from the training data and how to mitigate the problem. In CVPR, 2019.
D. Hendrycks and K. Gimpel. A baseline for detecting misclassified and out-of-distribution exam-
ples in neural networks. In ICLR, 2017.
D. Hendrycks, M. Mazeika, and T. Dietterich. Deep anomaly detection with outlier exposure. In
ICLR, 2019.
Diederik P Kingma and Max Welling. Auto-encoding variational bayes. In ICLR, 2014.
Durk P Kingma and Prafulla Dhariwal. Glow: Generative flow with invertible 1x1 convolutions. In
NeurIPS, pp. 10215–10224, 2018.
9
J. Kos, I. Fischer, and D. Song. Adversarial examples for generative models. In ICLR Workshop,
2017.
Alex Krizhevsky and Geoffrey Hinton. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. Tech-
nical report, Citeseer, 2009.
B. Lakshminarayanan, A. Pritzel, and C. Blundell. Simple and scalable predictive uncertainty esti-
mation using deep ensembles. In NeurIPS, 2017.
Yann LeCun, Léon Bottou, Yoshua Bengio, Patrick Haffner, et al. Gradient-based learning applied
to document recognition. Proceedings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
K. Lee, H. Lee, K. Lee, and J. Shin. Training confidence-calibrated classifiers for detecting out-of-
distribution samples. In ICLR, 2018a.
K. Lee, H. Lee, K. Lee, and J. Shin. A simple unified framework for detecting out-of-distribution
samples and adversarial attacks. In NeurIPS, 2018b.
Kimin Lee, Honglak Lee, Kibok Lee, and Jinwoo Shin. Training confidence-calibrated classifiers
for detecting out-of-distribution samples. arXiv:1711.09325, 2017.
Kimin Lee, Kibok Lee, Honglak Lee, and Jinwoo Shin. A simple unified framework for detecting
out-of-distribution samples and adversarial attacks. In NeurIPS, pp. 7167–7177, 2018c.
C. Leibig, V. Allken, M. S. Ayhan, P. Berens, and S. Wahl. Leveraging uncertainty information from
deep neural networks for disease detection. Scientific Reports, 7, 2017.
S. Liang, Y. Li, and R. Srikant. Enhancing the reliability of out-of-distribution image detection in
neural networks. In ICLR, 2018.
Shiyu Liang, Yixuan Li, and R Srikant. Enhancing the reliability of out-of-distribution image detec-
tion in neural networks. arXiv:1706.02690, 2017.
A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Valdu. Towards deep learning models
resistant to adversarial attacks. In ICLR, 2018.
M.Mirman, T. Gehr, andM. Vechev. Differentiable abstract interpretation for provably robust neural
networks. In ICML, 2018.
E. Nalisnick, A. Matsukawa, Y. Whye Teh, D. Gorur, and B. Lakshminarayanan. Do deep generative
models know what they don’t know? In ICLR, 2019.
Yuval Netzer, Tao Wang, Adam Coates, Alessandro Bissacco, Bo Wu, and Andrew Y Ng. Reading
digits in natural images with unsupervised feature learning. In AISTATS, 2011.
A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune. Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High confidence
predictions for unrecognizable images. In CVPR, 2015.
A. Raghunathan, J. Steinhardt, and P. Liang. Certified defenses against adversarial examples. In
ICLR, 2018.
Jie Ren, Peter J Liu, Emily Fertig, Jasper Snoek, Ryan Poplin, Mark A DePristo, Joshua V Dillon,
and Balaji Lakshminarayanan. Likelihood ratios for out-of-distribution detection. In NeurIPS,
2019.
Danilo Jimenez Rezende, Shakir Mohamed, and Daan Wierstra. Stochastic backpropagation and
approximate inference in deep generative models. 2014.
L. Schott, J. Rauber, M. Bethge, and W. Brendel. Towards the first adversarially robust neural
network model on mnist. preprint, arXiv:1805.09190v3, 2018.
Vikash Sehwag, Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Liwei Song, Chawin Sitawarin, Daniel Cullina, Mung Chiang,
and Prateek Mittal. Better the devil you know: An analysis of evasion attacks using out-of-
distribution adversarial examples. preprint, arXiv:1905.01726, 2019.
10
Alireza Shafaei, Mark Schmidt, and James J Little. Does your model know the digit 6 is not a cat?
a less biased evaluation of" outlier" detectors. arXiv:1809.04729, 2018.
Antonio Torralba, Rob Fergus, and William T Freeman. 80 million tiny images: A large data set for
nonparametric object and scene recognition. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine
intelligence, 30(11):1958–1970, 2008.
W. Wang, A. Wang, A. Tamar, X. Chen, and P. Abbeel. Safer classification by synthesis. preprint,
arXiv:1711.08534v2, 2018.
E. Wong and J. Zico Kolter. Provable defenses against adversarial examples via the convex outer
adversarial polytope. In ICML, 2018.
H. Xiao, K. Rasul, and R. Vollgraf. Fashion-MNIST: a novel image dataset for benchmarking
machine learning algorithms. preprint, arXiv:1708.07747, 2017.
A APPENDIX - PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Theorem A.1. Let (xi, yi)
n
i=1 be the training set of the training distribution. We define the model
for the conditional probability over the classes y ∈ {1, . . . ,M} given x as
pˆ(y|x) = pˆ(y|x, i)pˆ(x|i) +
λ
M
pˆ(x|o)
pˆ(x|i) + λpˆ(x|o) , (14)
where λ = pˆ(o)
pˆ(i) > 0 and M > 1. Further, let the model for the marginal density of the in-
distribution pˆ(x|i) and out-distribution p(x|o) be given by the generalized GMMs
pˆ(x|i) =
Ki∑
k=0
αk exp
(
−d(x, µk)
2
2σ2k
)
, pˆ(x|o) =
Ko∑
l=0
βl exp
(
−d(x, νl)
2
2θ2l
)
with αk, βl > 0 and µk, νl ∈ Rd ∀k = 1, . . .Ki, l = 1, . . . ,Ko and d : Rd×Rd → R+ a metric.
Let z ∈ Rd and define k∗ = argmin
k=1,...,Ki
d(z,µk)
σk
, i∗ = argmin
i=1,...,n
d(z, xi), l
∗ =
argmin
l=1,...,Ko
βl exp
(
− d(z,νl)2
2θ2l
)
and∆ =
θ2l∗
σ2
k∗
− 1. For any ǫ > 0, if minl θl > maxk σk and
mini=1,...,n d(z, xi) ≥ d(xi∗ , µk∗)+d(µk∗ , νl∗)
[ 2
∆
+
1√
∆
]
+
θl∗√
∆
√
log
( ǫ λ
M − 1
βl∗∑
k αk
)
, (15)
then it holds for allm ∈ {1, . . . ,M} that
pˆ(m|z) ≤ 1
M
(
1 + ǫ
)
. (16)
In particular, ifmini d(z, xi)→∞, then pˆ(m|z)→ 1M .
Proof. The proof essentially hinges on upper bounding
pˆ(z|i)
pˆ(z|o) using the specific properties of the
Gaussian mixture model. We note that
pˆ(y|x) = pˆ(y|x, i)pˆ(x|i) +
λ
M
pˆ(x|o)
pˆ(x|i) + λpˆ(x|o) =
1
M
1 + M
λ
pˆ(x|i)
pˆ(x|o)
1 + 1
λ
pˆ(x|i)
pˆ(x|o)
≤ 1
M
(
1 +
M − 1
λ
pˆ(x|i)
pˆ(x|o)
)
The last step holds because the function g(ξ) = 1+Mξ1+ξ is monotonically increasing
∂g
∂ξ
=
M − 1
(1 + ξ)2
and
∂2g
∂ξ2
= −2 M − 1
(1 + ξ)3
. (17)
As the second deriviative is negative for ξ ≥ 0, g is concave for ξ ≥ 0 and thus
1 +Mξ
1 + ξ
= g(ξ) ≤ g(0) + ∂g
∂ξ
∣∣∣
ξ=0
(ξ − 0) = 1 + (M − 1)ξ. (18)
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In order to achieve the required result we need to show that M−1
λ
pˆ(x|i)
pˆ(x|o) ≤ ǫ for x sufficiently far
away from the training data.
We note that
pˆ(x|i)
pˆ(x|o) =
∑
k αk exp
(
− d(x,µk)2
2σ2k
)
∑
l βl exp
(
− d(x,νl)2
2θ2l
) ≤ maxk exp
(
− d(x,µk)2
2σ2k
)∑
k αk
maxl βl exp
(
− d(x,νl)2
2θ2l
)
=
∑
k αk
βl∗
exp
(
−d(x, µk∗)
2
2σ2k∗
+
d(x, νl∗)
2
2θ2l∗
)
where k∗ = argmin
k
d(x,µk)
2
2σ2k
and l∗ = argmin
l
βl exp(− d(x,νl)
2
2θ2l
). Using triangle inequality,
d(x, νl∗) ≤ d(x, µk∗) + d(µk∗ , νl∗), we get the desired condition as∑
k αk
βl∗
exp
(
−d(x, µk∗)2
(
1
2σ2k∗
− 1
2θ2l∗
)
+
d(µk∗ , νl∗)d(x, µk∗ )
θ2l∗
+
d(µk∗ , νl∗)
2
2θ2l∗
)
≤ ǫ λ
M − 1
Thus we get with a =
(
1
2σ2
k∗
− 1
2θ2
l∗
)
, b = d(µk∗ ,νl∗ )
θ2
l∗
and c = d(µk∗ ,νl∗)
2
2θ2
l∗
, d = log
(
ǫ λ
M−1
βl∗∑
k αk
)
,
the quadratic inequality
−d(x, µk∗)2a+ d(x, µk∗ )b+ b
2
2
≤ d,
where d < 0 for sufficiently small ǫ. We get the solution
d(x, µk∗ ) ≥ b
2a
+
√
max
{
0,
c− d
a
+
b2
4a2
}
.
It holds, using
√
a+ b ≤ √a+√b for a, b > 0,
b
2a
+
√
max
{
0,
c− d
a
+
b2
4a2
}
≤ b
a
+
√
c
a
+
√
d
a
.
One can simplify
b
a
= 2
σ2k∗θ
2
l∗
θ2l∗ − σ2k∗
d(µk∗ , νl∗)
θ2l∗
= 2
σ2k∗ d(µk∗ , νl∗)
θ2l∗ − σ2k∗
= 2
d(µk∗ , νl∗)
θ2
l∗
σ2
k∗
− 1
c
a
= 2
σ2k∗θ
2
l∗
θ2l∗ − σ2k∗
d(µk∗ , νl∗)
2
2θ2l∗
=
σ2k∗ d(µk∗ , νl∗)
2
θ2l∗ − σ2k∗
=
d(µk∗ , νl∗)
2
θ2
l∗
σ2
k∗
− 1
Noting that d(x, µk∗) ≥ |d(x, xi∗ )− d(xi∗ , µk∗)| we get that
d(x, xi∗) ≥ d(xi∗ , µk∗) + b
2a
+
b
a
+
√
c
a
+
√
d
a
,
implies M−1
λ
pˆ(x|i)
pˆ(x|o) ≤ ǫ. The last statement follows directly by noting that by assumption a > 0
(independently of the choice of l∗ and k∗) and b, c, d(xi∗ , µk∗) are bounded as Ki,Ko, n are finite.
With ∆ =
θ2l∗
σ2
k∗
− 1 we can rewrite the required condition as
d(x, xi∗ ) ≥ d(xi∗ , µk∗) + d(µk∗ , νl∗)
[ 2
∆
+
1√
∆
]
+
θl∗√
∆
√
log
( ǫ λ
M − 1
βl∗∑
k αk
)
.
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B APPENDIX - PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.1
Corollary B.1. Let x0 ∈ Rd and R > 0, then with λ = pˆ(o)pˆ(i) it holds
max
d(x,x0)≤R
pˆ(y|x) ≤ 1
M
1 +M b
λ
1 + b
λ
, (19)
where b =
∑Ki
k=1
αk exp
(
−
max{d(x0,µk)−R,0}
2
2σ2
k
)
∑Ko
l=1 βl exp
(
−
(d(x0,νl)+R)
2
2θ2
l
) .
Proof. From the previous section we already know that pˆ(y|x) ≤ 1
M
1+M bλ
1+ bλ
as long as
p(x|i)
p(x|o) ≤ b.
Now we can separately bound the numerator and denominator within a ball of radius R around x0.
For the numerator we have
max
d(x,x0)≤R
pˆ(x|i) ≤
K∑
k=1
αk max
d(x,x0)≤R
e
−
d(x,µk)
2
2σ2
k (20)
≤
K∑
k=1
αk exp

− mind(x,x0)≤R d(x, µk)
2
2σ2k


≤
K∑
k=1
αk exp
(
− (max {d(µk, x0)−R, 0})
2
2σ2k
)
, (21)
where we have lower bounded min
d(x,x0)≤R
d(x, µk) via the reverse triangle inequality
min
d(x,x0)≤R
d(x, µk) ≥ min
d(x,x0)≤R
|d(x0, µk)− d(x, x0)|,
≥ max
{
min
d(x,x0)≤R
(d(x0, µk)− d(x0, µk)), 0
}
,
≥ max {d(x0, µk)− r, 0} . (22)
The denominator can similarly be bounded via
min
d(x,x0)≤R
pˆ(x|o) ≥
Ko∑
l=1
βl min
d(x,x0)≤R
e
−
d(x,νl)
2
2θ2
k (23)
≥
Ko∑
l=1
βl exp

− maxd(x,x0)≤R d(x, νl)
2
2θ2l


≥
Ko∑
l=1
βl exp
(
− (d(x0, νl) +R)
2
2θ2l
)
. (24)
With both of these bounds in place the conclusion immediately follows.
C APPENDIX - EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
Unless specified otherwise we use ADAM on MNIST with a learning rate of 1e − 3 and SGD with
learning rate 0.1 for the other datasets. The learning rate for the GMM is always set to 1e − 5. We
decrease all learning rates by a factor of 10 after 50, 75 and 90 epochs. Our batch size is 128, the
total number of epochs 100 and weight decay is set to 5e− 4.
When training ACET, OE and CCU with 80 million tiny images we pick equal batches of in- and
out-distribution data (corresponding to p(i) = p(o)) and concatenate them into a batches of size 256.
Note that during the 100 epochs only a fraction of the 80 million tiny images are seen and so there
is no risk of over-fitting.
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Figure 3: Histograms of bounds: Certified radius in transformed space for different datasets.
C.1 DATA AUGMENTATION
Our data augmentation scheme uses random crops with a padding of 2 pixels on MNIST and FM-
NIST. On SVHN and CIFAR10 the padding width is 4 pixels. For SVHN we fill the padding with
the value at the boundary and for CIFAR10 we apply reflection at the boundary pixels. On top of
this we include random horizontal flips on CIFAR10. For MNIST and FMNIST we generate 60000
such samples and for SVHN and CIFAR10 50000 samples by drawing from the clean dataset with-
out replacement. This augmented data is used to calculate the covariance matrix from equation 13.
During the actual training we use the same data augmentation scheme in a standard fashion.
C.2 ATTACK DETAILS
We begin with a step size of 3 and for each of the 50 restarts we randomly initialize at some point in
the ellipsoid. Whenever a gradient step successfully decreases the losses we increase the step size by
a factor of 1.1. Whenever the loss increases instead we use backtracking and decrease the step size
by a factor of 2. We apply normal PGD using the l2-norm in the transformed space to ensure that
we stay on the ellipsoid and after each gradient step we rotate back into the original space to project
onto the box [0, 1]d. The result is not guaranteed be on the ellipsoid so after the 500 steps we use
the alternating projection algorithm (Bauschke & Borwein, 1996) for 10 steps which is guaranteed
to converge to a point in the intersection of the ellipsoid and the box because both of these sets are
convex.
D APPENDIX - FINDING A THE CERTIFIABLE RADIUS
Since Corollary 3.1 does not explicitly give a radius, one has to numerically invert the bound. The
bound
b(R) =
∑Ki
k=1 αk exp
(
−max{d(x0,µk)−R,0}2
2σ2k
)
∑Ko
l=1 βl exp
(
− (d(x0,νl)+R)2
2θ2l
) (25)
is monotonically increasing in R. Thus, for a given sample x0 one can fix a desired bound
max
d(x,x0)≤R
pˆ(x|i) ≤ 1
M
ν, where ν ∈ (1,M) and then find the unique solution
b(R) =
ν − 1
M − ν λ (26)
for R via bisection. This radius Rˆ will then represent the maximal radius, that one can certify using
Corollary 3.1. The presumption is, of course, that for R = 0 one has a sufficiently low bound in the
first place, i.e. that a solution exists. In our experiments on uniform noise we did not encounter a
single counterexample to this assumption. We show the radii for the different datasets in Figure 3.
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